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*All and any comments welcome on this paper, for future use. All comments used will be 
acknowledged in the final version. This paper has not been written in a strictly academic style, it is 
more a ‘think-piece’, a play with a series of connected ideas.* 
 
1) Some opening remarks 
The study of politics and international relations is fundamentally about observing a complex world, 
trying to distil the crucial elements within it, labelling and providing qualities to those elements and 
then trying to draw generalizable lessons. That is the essence of our practice, in my view. Thus, a set 
of social practices and organisations that set out to shape narratives that are ‘acceptable’ or 
‘permissible’ should be one of the central concerns of all those who seek to study politics or 
international relations. It is my view that not only are intelligence agencies and practices the so-
called missing dimension in international relations, but they are the founding elements and sticky 
glue that binds states together. Within international history intelligencers provide a partially hidden 
but parallel account of diplomacy and diplomatic interplay that would cause a radical 
rehistoricisation of all that we understand to be the received wisdom of international relations.  
Those engaged in the practice and political control of intelligence agencies continually make the 
claim that these actors are impartial enforcers of rules and are impartial arbiters of risk avoidance 
and threat minimisation. Fine. But even the simplest application of reflexive thinking would surely 
illuminate the political role that intelligence agencies and officers must play on our political 
landscape: how can they be ‘apolitical’ or ‘objective’ when they make judgements about the 
behaviour of individuals, or the relative behaviours of other diplomats or states actors?  
We can bundle all of this mass of constructed identity and mutually constituted knowledge creation 
up into a set of practices and some obvious follow-on points: officers recruit like-minded officers 
(partly because recruitment is always about recruiting like with like, partly for security and ‘faith’ 
reasons, and partly for organisational efficiency). There should be nothing surprising about this, in 
terms of organisational practice, but also in the disabusing sense that intelligence is like the justice 
system. We like to think of natural justice, but in reality the justice system is about being able to say 
some rules were followed and an outcome was procedurally sound. The individual caught up in the 
justice system therefore feels massively aggrieved about the critical distance between natural justice 
and the emphasis on procedure, both positions are ‘correct’, but only one carries the weight of state 
power. Tough on you, the individual with romantic and quaint views. The same can be said of 
intelligence. It is not about pure knowledge or correct knowledge (whatever that means), it’s about 
‘best truth’ (a relative and structurally conditioned term) and ‘truth to power’ (an endstate that 
conditions all that goes before it). For those who continually find the decision of governments to go 
to war on ‘intelligence grounds’ a grave miscarriage of all that is right, they need to remember that it 
is not about having ‘pure and correct information’ (in the philosophical sense), it is about having 
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information that can be used for policy action and which sticks up as being sound, in the procedural 
sense: assessments and analysis are fluid and temporally determined. The correctness of a policy 
decision is determined historically, when more of the wider picture is known. We all feel that this 
was ‘wrong’, but in intelligence terms it is likely to have been ‘sound’. So, more fool you, the people 
who think that this is a higher-order intellectual endeavour – it is no more infallible than you or I 
making decisions based on partial or incomplete information. It is just that their judgements are 
about more important issues, or issues that have a wider and/or more dramatic impact.  
Making the argument that intelligence is highly political is in and of itself highly controversial. Some 
of the tensions it brings out include:   
 There will be an inevitable conflation between the act of shaping or controlling a narrative 
move and a ‘conspiracy’ to do so amongst detractors. ‘Are you saying that these people are 
deliberately trying to control our minds?’ &c &c.  
The answer to this tension is both yes and no. The reason that a yes can be posited here is because 
this is partly the role of intelligence officers and agencies. The counterterrorism efforts that followed 
the July 2005 bombings in London have been about challenging the spectrum of ideologies that sit 
behind the Islamic terrorist groups who target the UK. In doing so, there is an attempt to control the 
ideologies available to target communities, but also to try and bond society in general to a position 
of opposition to jihadists. This is to secure the interests of the majority, obviously. But it is still the 
deliberate attempt to control and shape a narrative, even if it is one that the vast majority of the 
population oppose. So, counterterrorism provides us with an obvious and stark example. We find 
less clear cut examples in the sphere of economic protest, for example. Here, those seeking radical 
alternative economic models often find themselves in the sights of government and private 
intelligence efforts: their narratives are curtailed partly as a side-issue of curtailing their activities 
(which do not comply with various legal, political or social norms) but also as a direct effort to 
marginalise their messages. It has to be said that these movements mostly act to their own 
detriment too.  
The control of narratives does, in the end, come as an only partially intended consequence of the 
discharge of a particular set of functions within government. This explains why the accusation of 
controlling political discourse or being ‘the thought police’ is so vehemently rejected by intelligence 
and police officers. It is more complicated than just discharging a role, there is a lot of bounded 
political and normative adherence too, but this complexity or nuance is often lost in the noise of the 
debate.  
 There will be a conflation between ‘narrative’ and ‘stories’  
Intelligence is partly about telling stories. Or certainly contributing to the construction of stories. 
And this is obviously different to tracking narratives. A short-hand might be to think of the stories 
that are spun by intelligence officers/agencies/handlers as being part of the mix that contributes to 
narrative. We should not underplay the value of looking at intelligence stories; however, they are a 
untapped reserve of value. The stories intelligence officers told about Saddam’s state of mind and 
intentions were a key plank in the case for war. Similarly, observations about the behaviour and 
banter within a target organisation becomes part of the story surrounding that group; they do not 
own the story, they are just impacted by it. Consequently if any of these stories bubble through into 
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the public sphere via courts or politicians it is quality and nature of the story that can condition what 
happens to those individuals or groupings, and ultimately the meta-narrative of what we believe in 
as a body politic or what we are willing to allow our elites to do.  
Within a more academic frame of reference, there are a number of intelligence scholars who have 
sought to connect up real-world intelligence with cultural depictions of intelligence practice. The 
most eminent is Toby Miller in his book ‘Spyscreen’ (2003), then a rash of books on James Bond (eg 
Black, Lindner 2003), some on Hitchcock and Le Carré (Aronoff 1998, Cohen 2005) and more general 
treatments, including my own (Dover 2009, Britton 2004, Biderman & Wallace 2004 and the 
excellent PhD thesis at King’s College London by Pierre Lethier 2011). The connection all of these 
scholars make is twofold: the first is the connection between the ‘real world’ and the fictional world, 
something which I argue is bound and fluid – cultural depictions and ‘reality’ continually learn and 
re-learn new understandings and interpretations. The second connection is the extent to which 
cultural depictions are closely related to real world events and provide, to a limited degree, a public 
information service function. This is further evidenced by the close liaison between the CIA, FBI and 
cinematic and television portrayals of their activities and, similarly, the advice that has been 
provided by British intelligence agencies to certain television and cinema projects. Cultural 
depictions of intelligence activity provide the public with easy to consume binaries: of heroes and 
villains, of moral codes to follow, of who to hate, and what to value. It is a powerful node of 
influence, and one that seems to be well understood by those in the community.  
The pejorative use of ‘political’  
For those who study the political world, the idea that an organ of state is political should be 
uncontroversial, and yet within intelligence studies ‘political’ equates to a pejorative labelling. If one 
describes intelligence as political, one is obviously on the side of damned. And yet, there is no 
obvious reason why this should be. To understand intelligence as a rounded social practice I think it 
is necessary to understand its function as a guardian and entrepreneur of certain norms: that is just 
how it operates in practice. It is not pejorative, just an observation, much as one might observe 
organisms multiplying in a petri dish.  A shift in the field to discussing the impact intelligence has on 
the political sphere, would be a welcome development.  
2) Intelligence as gatekeeper: the ‘official’ keepers of the record 
Two points: Very few people know that the Security Service archives are, in effect, the official 
archive of the British Communist Party, certainly from the 1920s and 30s. For without the 
government records, there would be no trace of the communist party members who travelled to the 
Soviet Union (out of their love of the ‘socialist utopia’) and who were then caught up and killed in 
one of Stalin’s purges. Paradoxically, therefore, the surveillance function of the then youthful Secret 
Service has served to make permanent a niche part of British political history and to give those on 
the margins of mainstream politics an enduring voice. As the tracking of social media becomes more 
prevalent, a scholar writing in a hundred years’ time about the political and social machinations of 
today might well point to the government archives of these records as an alternative moment of 
mass observation surveys.  
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The second point is a simple thought experiment. If one wanted to influence public understanding of 
an event, what would one have to do? Lord Leveson’s inquiry is covering one spread of possibilities 
for how politics and the media became proximate and mutually reinforcing. From the academic and 
intelligence perspective there is a slightly different dynamic at work. To gain academic credibility one 
has to publish in peer review journals and academic or trade press. That is the work which counts. 
The other more fun stuff, like blogging or conference papers does not count. And the bar for peer 
review or academic press is engagement with the literature and/or the production and analysis of 
new (often empirical) material. So, to throttle off new understandings of intelligence, one merely 
needs to throttle off the supply of empirical material that can be trusted, which in turn restricts the 
material that can be cited. One could also restrict access or opportunities to engage with sober and 
informed audiences, a key part of working in intelligence studies. And as a field, intelligence studies 
has relatively few, but quite stark branches: there are those who work on organisations (literally how 
bureaucracies work), those who produce diplomatic histories (in more or less of a novella style), 
those who are interested in the technical side of collection (widgets, gadgets and methods) those 
who talk of the politics of intelligence and those who are implacably opposed to all intelligence 
activity. Each of these areas lends itself to a particular kind of academic collection method and 
output, but for those who wish to be proximate to the actualité, there are serious penalties for being 
seen to have transgressed or to have dissented. You choose which side of history you are on, and 
you take the professional consequences of your choice. But via this short stream of consciousness, it 
is very possible to see how are collective printed and audio-visual knowledge of some key events can 
be shaped by a dynamic relationship between ‘authority’ and ‘scholarship’, and temporal factors – 
distance in time from the event can make evidence easier to come by, but key information may be 
permanently erased by that point.   
 
3. Shaping the story through shaping people. 
As with all areas of the study of intelligence this is an area loaded with controversy and can easily be 
misread, but I think this short analysis does stand up to some scrutiny.  
One of the jobs of field officers to is to convince (at its starkest) individuals to become agents: that 
is, to betray their country, the organisation they are associated with, or people that they are close to 
or have a close working knowledge about. There is nothing particularly pretty about this task. What 
makes it pretty is that it is sanctioned by the particular state, and in the belief that in being 
sanctioned by the state it carries a legitimacy (either technical or by implicit popular support). And 
that is the basis on which most human intelligence efforts are conducted. The impact of such activity 
on the target individual can be profound. In extremis, a voice might literally be lost, and the viability 
of target  groups (and their messages) may also be lost to history. Let us not necessarily mourn that 
loss, as of right, but we should note it. An echo from history might provide us with some insight into 
the impact on individuals and collectively too: the frequent misapplication of the title ‘communist 
sympathiser’ on members of the artistic and media fraternity during the early to mid-Cold War, 
excluded a generation of people deemed to be politically unacceptable (whether proven or not). The 
ideological lines are as neatly drawn now as they were in the Cold War (and adherents to the 
prevailing politics around the Westminster village can be mostly found in Westminster, so it is very 
tightly drawn debate indeed). The ubiquity of social media monitoring and the permanent smears of 
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social media detritus mean that our teenage radicals will never be free of their fleeting moments of 
political experimentation, whereas those with colourful political pasts in our recent political elites 
like Jack Straw, Peter Hain, Peter Mandelson and John Reid were able to transcend theirs. Vetting, in 
its loosest sense, might have to catch up with the changing realities on the ground: those who have 
never uttered a dozy thought might be thin-on-the-ground once the triopoly of Google, Facebook 
and Twitter have been trawled through thoroughly.  
4. Avoiding conspiracy theory, but acknowledging competition. 
Conspiracy theories are dogmatic beliefs in positions that are only tenuously supported by empirical 
discovery, or – even more frustratingly – the absence of empirical discovery. And whilst allocating a 
political role and function to intelligence attracts, amongst sober audiences, a sniff of ‘that’s just 
conspiracy theory nonsense’ there seems no reason to me why this set of organs of state should be 
any less political than the Treasury, or the Home Office. All of them, to varying degrees of 
transparency, seek to shape our understanding of the world, and to convince us of the need to 
support certain sorts of government initiatives. But I also think that part of the queasiness around 
this subject is wrapped up in the failure of the British state and British public (as particular examples) 
to understand competition, in a way that other states clearly have understood it. The shift from 
hard-power competition (a’la Cold War) to soft-power competition and influence (and the recent 
investigations into the exceptional funding arrangements of certain educational establishments give 
a clue to one sort of soft or influential power, the highly developed techniques of open source 
intelligence and intellectual property capture another, and the use of human resource, and 
positioning of people globally, yet another, and the soft funding of media and research, another). 
Competitor states and certain fractional interests in the international system seem (and one can only 
put it that strongly) to understand the use to which they put their intelligence agencies within a 
competitive stance: whilst in the UK we shy away from even acknowledging they might be political, 
or projecting certain kinds of norms.  The shorthand here is that the British intelligence system plays 
one variation of the game, and projects certain norms into it, but it might well be playing the wrong 
game, or looking the wrong way. As I noted on the blog-site I contribute to, Kings of War, how do we 
track and trace the influences being projected into the country? And how do we assess them against 
our own core interests? There are many divergent paths that future research into the use of 
intelligence in political narratives could go.  
 
Of elephants and religion: a conclusion. 
My central argument is that intelligence has a great deal of sway over the creation, maintenance and 
enforcement of key political narratives (and indeed the British state), and the destruction of political 
narratives deemed to be unpalatable by the agencies, their officers and their political masters, in 
varying mixes depending on the time and issue. I therefore think this work should be more 
prominently highlighted by those who study political narrative, and by those who think about 
international relations. Intelligence is like religion and large, room-based elephants: it is all around, 
and yet for the most part hidden.  
 
